

[REDACTED] #21-70

Approved For Release 2000/08/06 : CIA-RDP85-00875R000100010001-4

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

1 OF 1

27 MAY 1970

Confidential



Doc/Ser

TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

27 May 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 21)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

W A R N I N G

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

C O N T E N T S

Topics and Events Given Major Attention i

INDOCHINA

Victories Claimed in Cambodia During Past Two Months 1
Activities of "Patriotic" Forces in Cambodia Reported 3
Delegates at Paris Session Again Score U.S. "Escalation" 4
Rallies Throughout China Support Mao Statement 6
Moscow Radio Commentaries Attack Mao Statement 7
USSR Cautions "Phnom Penh Authorities" on War Policies 9
Sihanouk Lists Regimes That Recognized New Government 9
Vietnamese Communists Thank Mao for His Statement 10
PRC-DRV Supplemental Aid Agreement Signed in Peking 11
Sihanouk Delegation Visits Hanoi 12
Continued Criticism of Djakarta Conference 13

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Peking Notes Kuznetsov Presence at Rally on Mao Statement 15
Moscow Steps Up Attacks in Wake of PRAVDA Editorial Article 16

MALAYSIA

Malayan Communist Party Presses Maoist Case for Armed Struggle . . . 18

MIDDLE EAST

Kosygin Affirms Continued "Extensive" Assistance to Arabs 21
Eban U.S. Visit Seen as Step Conducive to New Escalation 23
Moscow Decries New Israeli "Provocations" Against Lebanon 24

NATO MEETING

USSR Sees Attempts to "Torpedo" European Security Conference 25

WEST GERMANY

GDR Leaves Door Open for More Talks after Kassel Summit 27
Moscow Reports End of Gromyko-Bahr Talks, Avoids Comment 30

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Polyanskiy Urges More for Agriculture in New Five-Year Plan 31

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Provincial Leadership Turnouts Indicate Some Changes 32
Editorial Stresses Party Leadership Over Creative Arts 33

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS TRENDS

27 MAY 1970

- i -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 18 - 24 MAY 1970

Moscow (3766 items)

Indochina	(21%)	17%
[Laos	(1%)	7%]
[Cambodia	(15%)	5%]
China	(5%)	12%
Middle East	(4%)	8%
Upcoming Supreme	(8%)	8%
Soviet Elections		
Komsomol Congress	(0.5%)	6%

Peking (3189 items)

Indochina	(55%)	78%
[Mao Statement	(--)	42%]*
[Cambodia	(53%)	24%]
[Vietnam	(2%)	9%]
[Laos	(0.3%)	1%]
Domestic Issues	(24%)	14%
[28th Anniversary	(--)	3%]
Mao's Statement		
at Yenan Forum on		
Literature and Art		
Indonesian Communist	(--)	3%
Party Anniversary		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* Includes rebroadcasts of the Mao statement (more than half of the figure) as well as comment in support of the statement.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

27 MAY 1970

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement expressing support for Sihanouk's Cambodian government and the "revolution" gets voluminous publicity in PRC media, with accounts of a 21 May rally in Peking where Lin Piao read the statement and Sihanouk spoke as well as reports of provincial rallies throughout the country. DRV and Front media have carried the text of Mao's statement, accompanied by approving comment which notes Chinese support and assistance. Soviet propaganda on Mao's statement says that "deeds" not "words" are what is needed and repeats the standard charge that the PRC has refused "joint action" on Indochina.

Moscow's failure so far to recognize Sihanouk's new government is pointed up on the 25th when TASS carries a statement made "on behalf of the Soviet Government to the Phnom Penh authorities" by Ambassador Kudryavtsev in Cambodia. Warning that Cambodia will be plunged into a "long fratricidal civil war" if measures are not taken to withdraw U.S. and Saigon troops, the statement says "those who connive" with the intervention "will bear responsibility for this." It goes on to say that the USSR "will make conclusions for its policy" on the basis of developments--whether Cambodia "returns to the road of peace and neutrality" or "turns to unity with the forces of aggression and war."

Hanoi's first word of Sihanouk's visit to the DRV came early on the 25th--the day he arrived--when VNA quoted a DRV Foreign Ministry communique of the 23d as saying he would visit the DRV "in the near future" at the invitation of President Ton Duc Thang. DRV press articles and editorials on the 25th and 26th hailing the visit call the Prince the "great friend" of the Vietnamese people and reaffirm Vietnamese friendship and solidarity with the Khmer and Lao peoples, as manifested during the April Indochinese summit meeting.

Current Vietnamese communist propaganda reviews the two-month-old "Cambodian people's patriotic struggle," claiming that "over 40 district capitals and military subsectors and hundreds of hamlets have been liberated" and more than one million people in those areas "freed." Current Hanoi propaganda also reviews U.S. "aggressive" policy on Indochina since World War II.

VICTORIES CLAIMED IN CAMBODIA DURING PAST TWO MONTHS

The second month's anniversary of Sihanouk's 23 March call to arms to overthrow the Lon Nol government prompts a flurry of Vietnamese communist propaganda on 22 May reviewing the "Cambodian people's patriotic struggle." A VNA review of activity is typical in claiming

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

27 MAY 1970

- 2 -

that "over 40 district capitals and military subsectors and hundreds of hamlets have been liberated" by the Cambodian liberation forces in Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Kandal, Kompong Speu, Kompong Chhnang, Takeo, Kampot, Mondulhiri, Kratie, Stung Treng, Battambang, and Siem Reap provinces. NHAN DAN's 22 May editorial says that the areas liberated "embrace over one million people" and that "people's power" has been set up in many provinces and districts and hundreds of hamlets. The editorial also claims that more than 24,000 enemy troops, nearly 2,000 of them American, "have been put out of action or disbanded."

The NHAN DAN editorial says the allies did not accomplish their aim of reversing the situation by a "surprise attack" and by dispatching to Cambodia "nearly 100,000 U.S. and Saigon puppet troops." Persisting in the fiction that Vietnamese communist troops are not among the protagonists, NHAN DAN claims that the Cambodian patriotic forces have developed rapidly and that "many units of the national liberation army have been formed along with hundreds of guerrilla brigades." A measure of the effort to maintain the fiction is evident in a 25 May Hanoi broadcast in Vietnamese to South Vietnam which cites foreign news dispatches on the allied aim of clearing out "communist" sanctuaries in Cambodia. The broadcast not only obscures the fact that the sanctuaries are Vietnamese in quoting AFP as saying "the communists have proven they have the combat initiative by launching a series of violent attacks in the Kompong Cham area," it goes so far as to insert an editorial note to the effect that "communists" means "the Cambodian patriotic armed forces."

A Liberation Radio commentary on the 26th is even more blatant: discussing the operations in Cambodia since 30 April, it says the Americans have grossly exaggerated the quantity of weapons captured and their alleged annihilation of enemy troops--"that is, troops of the Khmer Patriotic Armed Forces."

On the 25th VNA reviews a NHAN DAN commentary which repeats the statistics in the NHAN DAN editorial on allied losses and goes on to discuss the "political isolation" of the United States which has resulted from the intervention in Cambodia. The commentary says that "for the time being, the Nixon clique is unwilling to withdraw from the new morass in Cambodia" and that Defense Secretary Laird "has stated that after 30 June the United States would continue its air strikes and Saigon puppet troops would continue their operations on Cambodian soil." The commentary sets out to "expose" U.S. actions against Cambodia over the past 15 years. Other, similar comment includes a NHAN DAN commentary on the 23d which reviews U.S. policy on Indochina as far back as the 1943 Casablanca conference

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 3 -

and concludes that President Nixon's "sophistries and lies show that Nixon is the most stubborn, brutal, and stupid among the U.S. warmongers in Indochina."

There is little propaganda attention to specific, current operations. But Liberation Radio on the 26th carries a brief report on the 23 May allied air strikes against facilities of the French-managed rubber plantation in Chup, Kompong Cham Province. Citing an undated AGENCE KHMER DE PRESSE dispatch, Liberation Radio says that a large number of the personnel were killed and that the plantation is completely inoperative.

ACTIVITIES OF "PATRIOTIC" FORCES IN CAMBODIA REPORTED

Liberation Radio on 22 May recounted a 7-8 May meeting held in a Cambodian "liberated area" by an organization affiliated with the United National Front of Kampuchea (FUNK). Citing the FUNK's Information Bureau as its source, the broadcast said that delegates of the "Cambodian People's Movement of Militant Solidarity," affiliated with the FUNK, met for the purpose of endorsing the 3-4 May conference held in Peking in connection with the formation of Sihanouk's "Royal Government of National Union," the FUNK's Political Bureau, and its political progress.

The three individuals who reportedly are in Cambodia as representatives of the FUNK and as government ministers were mentioned as being present: Khieu Samphan, identified as movement representative in eastern Cambodia and PLAF representative; Hou Youn as representative in northwestern Cambodia; and Hu Nim as representative of southwestern Cambodia. Other individuals were named as representatives of the People's Group (Pracheachon), as well as of such typical "front" bodies as the Kampuchea peasants association, the trade unions association, the democratic youth association, and the ethnic minorities association.

On the 24th Liberation Radio carried the text of an appeal issued in the name of Khieu Samphan in his role as Minister of National Defense in Sihanouk's government. Dated the 15th, the appeal calls on the Cambodian people and combatants to rally behind the FUNK and its armed forces and resist the "U.S. aggressors and their henchmen." Khieu Samphan also ridicules the notion that the Viet Cong headquarters is in Cambodia and that Viet Cong forces in Cambodia are threatening U.S. troops in South Vietnam. The appeal says these allegations "have proven . . . false and deceitful" and aimed at concealing the collusion among the United States, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

27 MAY 1970

- 4 -

DELEGATES AT PARIS SESSION AGAIN SCORE U.S. "ESCALATION"

The VNA account of the 67th session of the Paris talks on 21 May notes that the PRG and DRV delegates "vehemently condemned" U.S. intensification of the war in South Vietnam and expansion of the war in Cambodia and Laos. Both delegates also scored alleged U.S. provocations against the DRV.* VNA reports that PRG deputy delegation head Dinh Ba Thi, speaking first, pointed out that the actual number of U.S. troops in South Vietnam has increased over the past month "by 5,000 men or so," notwithstanding President Nixon's 20 April announcement that 150,000 troops will be withdrawn by next spring. Thi also complained that sweep operations continued along with B-52 strikes "even in provinces next door to Saigon."

VNA glosses over most of Thi's statements on Cambodia, but it does report him as saying that the dispatch of U.S. troops there "cannot save the Saigon and Phnom Penh puppet regimes." LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY,** but not VNA, reports that Thi, citing "concrete evidence," refuted the Nixon Administration's "claims" that "it is pulling American and Saigon troops out of Cambodia and that it has recorded a big victory." But VNA does report that Vy said the Nixon Administration is trying to pave the way both for a "prolonged military occupation" of Cambodia by U.S. forces, in disregard of its own 30 June deadline for an American pullout from Cambodia, and for the indefinite stationing of U.S. or Saigon "puppet" troops on Cambodian territory.

Neither VNA nor LPA notes Thi's remarks on an anticommunist alliance of the Phnom Penh, Saigon, Vientiane, and Bangkok regimes. But VNA says DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy "exposed" U.S. maneuvers in setting up an alliance between those four "stooge" administrations. The VNA account also says Vy "exposed" the recent Djakarta conference on Cambodia, but it does not go on to note that he quoted at length from the 17 May statement of Sihanouk's "Royal Government of National Union" denouncing the Djakarta meeting. In reporting the give-and-take

* Hanoi reported on the 25th that the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman "energetically protested" U.S. "strafing" of Vinh Quang village, Vinh Linh area, on the 24th and the dispatch of aircraft to intensify encroachments on the DRV air space "during the past few days."

** Liberation Radio in the past has usually broadcast the full text of the PRG delegate's prepared statement, but no account of the 21 May session has been monitored.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 5 -

portion of the session, VNA says typically that the DRV and PRG delegates "laid bare the hypocritical allegations of the U.S. and Saigon delegates and denounced the so-called 'Asian conference on Cambodia' as essentially intended to serve the U.S. scheme of aggression."

VNA says that Vy "denounced" the Nixon Administration for "its obstinate neocolonialist position at the Paris conference, thus blocking it after 16 months of negotiations," but the account fails to acknowledge that in this context Vy quoted former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford as saying in his current LIFE article that President Nixon "still seeks to gain the military victory that cannot be won." The only available reference to Clifford's article in regular DRV media* is in a Hanoi radio domestic service news item on 18 May which quotes the article as saying that the United States cannot achieve a military victory in Vietnam and that a political solution is the only practical way to peace. The item also notes that Clifford appealed for a withdrawal of U.S. troops by the end of 1971 and "urged the U.S. people to pressure Nixon into changing U.S. policy in Vietnam."

VNA does not acknowledge that Vy cited, and ridiculed, Ambassador Habib's reference at the 14 May session to President Nixon's 30 April remark that the time came long ago to end the Vietnam war through peaceful negotiations. And VNA's account of the allied delegates' remarks at the session simply says they "rehashed their allegations aimed at covering up the U.S. war of expansion in Indochina and the traitorous nature of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem stooge administration."

LAOS VNA's account states that at one point GVN delegate Lam "had to admit the fact that Saigon puppet troops had frequently intruded into Laos." (VNA does not indicate the context in which Lam made this remark, which is not in his prepared statement.)

DRV delegate Vy said in his prepared statement, as reported by VNA, that in addition to the 12,000 U.S. military personnel in Laos "the United States has ordered many American units as well as units of Saigon mercenaries commanded by U.S. advisers to cross the border and attack Laos." Vy did not refer specifically in this connection to the remarks on ARVN ground incursions by GVN Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam in a Djakarta press conference. But Lam's

* A 26 May message in VNA's service channel from its headquarters in Hanoi to Paris requested the English text of the Clifford article.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

27 MAY 1970

- 6 -

disclosure and subsequent remarks by Secretary Laird prompted statements by spokesmen of the NLHX Central Committee and the DRV Foreign Ministry on 21 May and of the PRG Foreign Ministry on the 22d.

Peking and Moscow have both reported the Vietnamese and Laotian statements, and TASS also carries brief reports of the comments by Lam and Laird. TASS acknowledges that Laird said the U.S. operations were "short-term" and "defensive," but an IZVESTIYA article charges that they are part of U.S. plans to escalate the war in Indochina.

XUAN THUY Hanoi radio on the 21st carried a report on the
IN HANOI activities of Xuan Thuy, head of the DRV delegation
 at the Paris talks, since his return to the DRV on
17 May. The account says Xuan Thuy reported to the party's Politburo and Secretariat and the DRV Council of Ministers on the status of the Paris talks. It indicates that he defended the "fair and reasonable" stand of the DRV and PRG and "sternly" condemned the "obdurate, warlike, and perfidious" Nixon Administration. It also notes that the Council of Ministers "unanimously endorsed" Xuan Thuy's findings and held that the DRV delegation at the talks during the past two years had "acted in accordance with the policy lines mapped out by the party and government."

On his previous trip to the DRV in mid-1969 Xuan Thuy had also appraised the status of the negotiations in reports during June to Ho Chi Minh, the Politburo, the National Assembly Standing Committee, and the Council of Ministers.

RALLIES THROUGHOUT CHINA SUPPORT MAO STATEMENT

Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement on Cambodia and Indochinese developments is supported by a massive Peking propaganda campaign which includes publicity for a 21 May Peking rally and provincial rallies throughout the country.* At the Peking rally Lin Piao read Mao's statement, which had been released by NCNA some 12 hours earlier, and other speakers vowed "firm support" and "powerful backing" for the Indochinese people's struggle. Sihanouk thanked the Chinese for their "invaluable support and many-sided and decisive assistance" and pointed to the determination of the three Indochinese

* Mao's 16 April 1968 statement following the assassination of Martin Luther King got similar treatment. The most recent spate of regional Chinese rallies came in August and September 1969 in connection with the Sino-Soviet border clashes.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

27 MAY 1970

- 7 -

peoples to continue the fight against the invaders in a "unified struggle." He also stressed that the Khmer people are "prepared to persevere in a protracted people's war."

The PRC provincial reaction to Mao's statement has been "unprecedented in scale," according to NCNA, which reports a major rally in every province and independent municipality. Most of the rallies were attended by large numbers of provincial leaders. The accounts of the rallies reflect the rhetoric of the national media, expressing confidence that the United States, beset with its own revolution, will soon be thrown out of Cambodia by the Cambodians. Few of the speakers are quoted as going beyond Mao's expression of "firm support" for the Indochinese people by means of "concrete actions" (defined merely as increased production at home), although some do call U.S. aggression in Indochina "a serious provocation to the people of China."*

MOSCOW RADIO COMMENTARIES ATTACK MAO STATEMENT

Moscow condemns Mao's statement in some routine-level radio comment which repeats standard charges that the Chinese follow a splittist line and that Mao's words on support for the Indochinese people do not accord with Peking's actions. Recalling the 4 May Soviet Government statement's call for strengthened unity, a 23 May Mandarin-language commentary says Mao's statement shows up his stand as that of "a false revolutionary who vociferously clamors for opposing imperialism but who in reality is giving up such a struggle." Struggling against imperialism with concrete action means giving "all-round aid" to the revolutionary fighters of the world and strengthening the solidarity of the socialist community, the commentary says, and it notes that Mao did not mention the international socialist movement or the "big socialist community of friendship." The broadcast concludes with the charge that Peking "synchronizes" its activities with the imperialists, asserting that the United States invaded Cambodia soon after the publication of the 22 April Peking joint editorial which opposed the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

* The 4 May PRC Government statement assailing U.S. actions in Cambodia and the "resumed bombing" of the DRV termed the U.S. moves a provocation against China, and the 28 April PRC Government statement supporting the Indochinese people's summit conference renewed the charge that the Americans were trying to turn Indochina into a "base for aggression against China and other Asian countries."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 8 -

Another commentary broadcast in Mandarin on 22 May charges that Mao's statement is aimed at deceiving world opinion, exploiting world protests against U.S. aggression, and projecting an image of the Peking leaders as "uncompromising fighters" in the struggle against U.S. imperialism. The commentary denounces Mao's "pseudorevolutionary nature" and says his statement points up his splittist activities and his "hypocritical appeal for unity of the peoples of the world." It notes that Mao has rejected suggestions made by the socialist countries for united action, and it recalls that at the international communist conference in Moscow last June Gomulka had said Peking's anti-Soviet policy made the Chinese anti-imperialist declarations "meaningless."*

Other Moscow comment, not pegged to the Mao statement, also continues to score Peking's policies in Indochina. A domestic service commentary by Kapitsa on 23 May, charging that the United States takes advantage of Peking's splittism in various parts of the world, recalls that Peking refused a CPSU-VWP suggestion that the USSR, the DRV, and the PRC "issue a joint warning against American aggression" (Kapitsa offers no further elaboration), as well as other proposals by socialist states for united action in Vietnam. Kapitsa repeats the charge that Peking's anti-Sovietism created the circumstances for the coup that overthrew Sihanouk in Cambodia.

Moscow also castigates Peking for its absence from the international conference to support the Laotian people's struggle, held in Cairo 19-21 May under the sponsorship of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization. A 24 May Radio Peace and Progress commentary in Mandarin notes that 160 delegates from 70 national and regional organizations attended and that "in view of the Maoist propaganda machinery's publications containing many statements supporting the world people's struggle," China should have sent a delegation. Criticizing the Chinese leaders for the "inconsistency" of their words and deeds, the commentary repeats the allegation that Mao has "flatly rejected" the proposal for a "united front of the anti-imperialist forces" to aid Vietnam. It adds that Mao is intensifying the "anti-Soviet, anti-socialist frenzy in China in an attempt to alienate the people of the Indochinese countries from their loyal friends, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."

* Gomulka also charged at the conference that Peking had "broken the solidarity" of the world communist movement and said that the USSR now formed the "main barrier" to imperialist aggression. He concluded with a call for unity of the world communist movement as the vanguard of the world anti-imperialist front.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 MAY 1970

- 9 -

USSR CAUTIONS "PHNOM PENH AUTHORITIES" ON WAR POLICIES

Moscow's cautious attitude toward the Lon Nol regime and its failure to recognize the new Sihanouk government are pointed up by the "statement on behalf of the Soviet Government" made on 24 May by the USSR Ambassador in Cambodia to the "Phnom Penh authorities." TASS, in releasing the statement on the 25th, says it was published in IZVESTIYA that day; the TASS press review on the 26th reports that it was published in the Moscow "papers."

Expressing concern that "Cambodia is being increasingly drawn into the military conflict in Indochina," the statement warns that "unless measures are taken to withdraw the U.S. and Saigon troops, Cambodia will be plunged into a long fratricidal civil war." The statement says that "those who connive with the U.S. and Saigon intervention will bear responsibility for this," but it fails to name the Lon Nol government. Similarly, without mentioning Sihanouk by name, the statement praises the "peaceful neutralist policy that was earlier conducted by Cambodia." It concludes by warning that the Soviet Union "closely follows the development of the situation" in Cambodia and Indochina and will "make conclusions for its policy from the direction in which this situation develops--toward Cambodia's return to the road of peace and neutrality or toward its unity with the forces of aggression and war and the turning of Cambodia into a base of war against the neighboring peoples."

This seeming veiled threat that the USSR might recognize the Sihanouk government if the Lon Nol regime does not follow policies acceptable to the Soviet Union is reminiscent of a remark by Kosygin at his 4 May Moscow press conference. Asked which Cambodian government the USSR recognizes, he answered evasively: "We recognize the neutralist government of Cambodia. We recognize as the government of Cambodia the one which pursues a policy of peace and not a policy of war."

SIHANOUK LISTS REGIMES THAT RECOGNIZED NEW GOVERNMENT

In his speech at the Peking rally on the 21st, Sihanouk stressed the legitimacy of his Royal Government of National Union, noting among other things that Mao's statement said the government had been recognized by "nearly 20 countries." Sihanouk named 19--including Guinea, which was not previously known to have announced recognition--and also listed "the Laotian people represented by the NLHX." The others named by Sihanouk had previously announced

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
27 MAY 1970

- 10 -

recognition: the PRC, DPRK, Cuba, Albania, PRG, DRV, Romania, Syria, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Algeria, South Yemen, Congo (B), Mauritania, and the UAR.

In a remark that could be interpreted as critical of the USSR, Sihanouk expressed hope that in the days to come "the governments of other socialist, progressive, anti-imperialist, and antifascist countries" will give the Khmers "effective support," but he did not explicitly ask for recognition. Sihanouk is not known to have mentioned his reported response to Kosygin's message greeting the formation of the united front of Cambodia; AFP's Moscow correspondent reported in a 12 May dispatch that Sihanouk "immediately" thanked Kosygin for his telegram but formally requested official Soviet recognition of his new government.

DIPLOMATS' RETURN TO CHINESE CAPITAL The "triumphant" return to Peking of the Chinese and North Korean diplomatic personnel formerly in Phnom Penh, who had "overcome many obstacles" placed in their way by the U.S. imperialists and the "Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique," was reported by NCNA on 25 May. On the 27th NCNA reported a banquet for the diplomats hosted by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, at which Li stressed the "unity" of the people of China, Korea, and the three Indochinese countries in their "common struggle" against U.S. imperialism. He noted that all these countries are "fraternal neighbors linked by mountains and rivers" and that the current struggle against U.S. aggression "forges a closer link between us." He reiterated that the 700 million Chinese people are the "reliable friend and powerful backing" and that the land of China is the "dependable rear" of the peoples of the Indochinese countries and of Korea.

On the 26th the Phnom Penh domestic service reported the return home of the Cambodian diplomats formerly in China and North Korea. On 9 May Peking and Pyongyang had scored the Phnom Penh authorities for holding their diplomatic personnel as "hostages" until the return home of the Cambodian diplomats representing the Lon Nol government in China and North Korea.

VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS THANK MAO FOR HIS STATEMENT

According to NCNA on the 25th, DRV President Ton Duc Thang and First Secretary Le Duan sent a telegram to Mao expressing "heartfelt thanks" for his "firm support" to the Vietnamese people's war of resistance. The telegram also says that the Vietnamese people, along with the Laotian and Cambodian peoples, regard Mao's statement as a document of "tremendous political significance" and are forever grateful for the PRG's "tremendous and valuable support and assistance."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

27 MAY 1970

- 11 -

On the 27th NCNA reported that NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat also sent a message expressing their "deep heartfelt thanks" to Mao for "the new and most valuable support and assistance he has extended" in his 20 May statement. At this writing, Vietnamese communist media have not acknowledged either message.

A Hanoi domestic service commentary on 21 May and a NHAN DAN editorial carried by VNA on the 22d also praise the Mao statement. The editorial warmly thanks the Chinese for their support and assistance but also stresses the importance of support and assistance given by "the fraternal socialist countries and the people the world over." Similarly, an LPA editorial on 22 May concludes that the Indochinese peoples will be victorious with the support and assistance of "the people of China, the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, the nationalist countries, and the progressive people the world over, including the American people."

PRC-DRV SUPPLEMENTAL AID AGREEMENT SIGNED IN PEKING

Hanoi and Peking media reported on 26 May that a new protocol on "China's supplementary nonrefundable economic and military aid to Vietnam for 1970" was signed in Peking the preceding day by DRV Vice Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban and PRC Vice Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang. The last regular annual PRC-DRV aid agreement was signed by DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi last September. This is the first known special PRC-DRV agreement.* In line with customary practice, the September 1969 agreement did not include trade, and a separate trade agreement was signed in Peking by Ly Ban in November.

The current agreement represents the first instance in which Peking media are known to have specified military aid, although in 1968 and 1969 Hanoi had described the agreements with Peking as providing for military as well as economic assistance. In the past Peking acknowledged only that the agreements provided economic and technical assistance.

* Le Thanh Nghi made a special trip to the USSR in November 1968 to sign an extra aid agreement in addition to the ones signed during his usual tours.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

27 MAY 1970

- 12 -

VNA says the Ly Ban delegation arrived in Peking "recently," but NCNA specifies that Ly Ban arrived in Peking on 2 May.* Both VNA and NCNA report that he left Peking on 26 May, having been received by Chou En-lai during his visit.

SIHANOUK DELEGATION VISITS HANOI

On 25 May Hanoi media released a DRV Foreign Ministry communique--dated the 23d--announcing that Sihanouk would visit the DRV "in the near future" at the invitation of President Ton Duc Thang. Sihanouk and his 18-member entourage arrived at 11:15 am local time on the 25th, according to VNA and Hanoi reports the next day. Soviet and PRC media have also announced his arrival.

VNA says Sihanouk arrived at Hanoi's Gia Lam airport "on a special plane," but it does not specify that he had come from Peking. He was met by an official delegation including Premier Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh, and a group of Young Pioneers presented flowers to "Uncle Sihanouk." Later, a welcoming reception at the Municipal Theater was hosted by President Thang and attended by Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and other leaders.

In his welcoming address Thang praised the Prince and extolled the "great significance" of his visit to the DRV, adding that the visit is a good opportunity for the Vietnamese people to express their "deep feelings and sincere gratitude" toward the Cambodian people and Sihanouk for their "powerful support" of the Vietnamese struggle against the United States. In response Sihanouk recalled his visit to the DRV for Ho Chi Minh's funeral last September and thanked his hosts for their current warm welcome--a "brilliant symbol of the total support" which the DRV and the Vietnamese people have "always accorded to the brother Khmer people and their legitimate government." The Prince went on to assert that the three Indochinese peoples did not want this "second Indochina war," but "it has been imposed on them by Nixon." He added that acceptance of the U.S. challenge and unity-in-struggle among the Indochinese peoples constitute the "only way" left to achieve a total American withdrawal and U.S. respect for the three peoples' right to self-determination.

* The negotiations were presumably going on during Le Duan's 10-12 May official visit to China after his attendance at the Lenin centenary celebrations in Moscow and his "rest" in Poland. The first known mention that Ly Ban was in Peking was an 8 May NCNA report that he was among those who attended a performance the previous evening of a visiting DRV amateur art ensemble.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

27 MAY 1970

- 13 -

A flurry of propaganda welcoming Sihanouk includes articles and editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 25th and 26th and Liberation Radio commentaries which stress Indochinese solidarity and recall the April summit meeting.

CONTINUED CRITICISM OF DJAKARTA CONFERENCE

Communist propaganda continues to score the communique issued by the 11-nation Djakarta conference on Cambodia held 16-17 May, but only the DRV has issued an official statement. A 25 May DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement echoes the foreign ministry statement of the 14th in saying that the conference had not competence to deal with the issues. Like a NHAN DAN article of the 24th, it acknowledges that the conference communique called for reactivation of the ICC as well as the reconvening of the Geneva conference and a UN role in Cambodia. Initial Hanoi comment after the meeting had ignored the communique's reference to the ICC.

Sihanouk denounced the Djakarta conference in his 21 May speech at the Peking rally, describing it routinely as a gathering of U.S. lackeys and satellites. He also explicitly rejected the call for reactivation of the ICC and convocation of a Geneva-type conference, saying that the ICC and the advocates of a conference should simply compel President Nixon to respect the Geneva agreements and withdraw his troops from Cambodia and the rest of Indochina. The conference had been scored earlier in a 17 May statement of the Royal Government of National Union.

Initial Moscow comment on the conference had termed the call for a Geneva conference "untimely" but did not mention the ICC. The reference to the ICC is noted in a PRAVDA article, summarized by TASS on the 20th, which says cryptically that "one can raise the question of the revival of the ICC" but "one should not forget that many of the present participants" in the meeting are "active allies" of the United States and are "directly responsible for the frustration of the Geneva agreements."

A 21 May Moscow commentary in English to South Asia reacts negatively to the notion of a conference on Cambodia without mentioning the Djakarta meeting. It cites a Malaysian paper as seeking to "blame the Soviet Union for the aggression carried out by the ruling quarters of the United States," claiming that "if the Soviet Union had heeded the proposal of a number of countries to call another conference in order to insure Cambodia's neutrality" the United States might not have interfered in Cambodia. The commentator remarks only that the paper has "naive" ideas about U.S. imperialism and that it is the United States which has failed to live up to the Geneva agreements.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 14 -

The Bombay PTI reported on 23 May that Kosygin had met the Indian Ambassador and that the major topic of their conversation was developments in Cambodia "in the light of the recent Soviet Government statement and pronouncements of the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Ghandi." TASS' report of the meeting, on the 22d, merely notes that there was a "friendly conversation," with no mention of the substance.

Soviet media have not acknowledged Western press reports, citing British officials, of a recent exchange of letters between London and Moscow, in their roles as Geneva conference cochairs, regarding a new conference.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 15 -

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PEKING NOTES KUZNETSOV PRESENCE AT RALLY ON MAO STATEMENT

Peking has again signalled its interest in sustaining the Sino-Soviet talks despite the recent bitter and authoritative polemical exchange. NCNA's report on the 21 May Peking rally in support of Mao's statement on Cambodia and worldwide anti-U.S. struggle singled out the presence of Soviet chief negotiator Kuznetsov and his deputy at the talks, General Gankovskiy. Earlier, NCNA had similarly taken note of the presence of Gankovskiy at Peking's May Day celebrations, at a time when Kuznetsov was back in Moscow. NCNA's 21 May mention of Kuznetsov is the first report on his whereabouts to appear in either side's media since before his visit to Moscow. There have been no announcements on the border talks themselves.

While drawing on the authority of Mao's name to pose as champions of people's war in Indochina and revolutionary struggle throughout the world--a posture that is evoking defensive sniping from the Soviet side--the Chinese have largely refrained from joining battle with Moscow since their attacks on the Soviets on May Day. Propaganda pegged to the Mao statement, including nationwide rallies, has lacked any anti-Soviet dimension, as has recent Chinese comment on Indochina and the revolutionary movement generally. A CCP message on the Indonesian CP's anniversary, transmitted by NCNA on 22 May, did raise one point in the ideological dispute by attributing the Indonesian communists' 1965 debacle to the line of peaceful transition "advocated by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique." This point was echoed in a statement on the anniversary by the Indonesian communist delegation in Peking, released by NCNA on the 23d, which also picked up Maoist cudgels to attack "Soviet revisionist social imperialism" as the "arch renegade to Leninism."

Peking's efforts to break out of its isolation, which have been especially in evidence since Chou En-lai's visit to the DPRK in early April, are reflected in recent references to ambassadors from Romania and Yugoslavia, two countries which followed the PRC's lead in supporting Sihanouk's government-in-exile. NCNA's report on the 21 May rally listed the Romanian ambassador among a group of favored guests, including envoys from such countries as Albania, the DRV, and North Korea. On 23 May NCNA announced the arrival of a Yugoslav ambassador to the PRC, the first representation on this level since 1958.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 16 -

MOSCOW STEPS UP ATTACKS IN WAKE OF PRAVDA EDITORIAL ARTICLE

PRAVDA's authoritative indictment of the Maoist leadership in the 18 May editorial article sparked a flurry of attacks on Chinese policies in Soviet central media and renewed emphasis on the theme of Chinese war preparations and anti-Soviet hysteria, muted in recent weeks. Articles critical of the Chinese appeared in LITERARY GAZETTE on 20 and 27 May and in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and TRUD on the 21st, and a succession of commentaries in Radio Moscow's domestic service beginning on the 20th presented a sustained assault on Peking's domestic and foreign policies for Soviet audiences.

A report to a Komsomol congress by Komsomol leader Tyazhelnikov on the 26th declares that Soviet youth cannot remain indifferent to the fate of the younger generation in China and expresses regret at the rupture of contacts between Soviet and Chinese youth which occurred "not through the Komsomol's fault." The report endorses Soviet efforts to normalize Sino-Soviet relations but does not mention the Peking talks.*

Press comment portrays China as suffering under military repression and economic chaos and accuses Peking of fostering a myth of an imminent armed invasion to put the screws to the Chinese people. Without directly mentioning the Chinese space satellite, the papers take note of Peking's emphasis on rapid development of the war industry and branches of the economy connected with it; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and TRUD both say resources are being used to develop a "nuclear missile potential" at the expense of consumer goods production. The thrust of the criticism has been directed at the burdens being placed on the Chinese people rather than at depicting a threat to China's neighbors.

Soviet sensitivity over Japanese bridgebuilding propensities toward the PRC is reflected in the LITERARY GAZETTE article on the 27th, which takes note of the role played by leaders of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party in promoting Sino-Japanese trade relations. Addressing what must be a particularly worrisome prospect for the Soviets, the article points out that American and Japanese leaders hope Japan may play a special role in building bridges between Peking and Washington.

* Brezhnev also addressed the congress, but his brief remarks on international affairs did not single out any specific area other than to mention the youth movement in the capitalist countries.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 17 -

Commentaries carried by the domestic radio criticize Chinese policies along the lines of the PRAVDA editorial article, including charges that Peking substitutes ultrarevolutionary rhetoric for united action and favors war as a means of advancing its interests. A commentary on 21 May sounded a note of alarm in taking Mao to task for irresponsible views on the role of war. In the light of these views the process of militarization now taking place in China assumes an "especially ominous significance," according to the commentator, who went on to cite Chinese appeals to prepare for war against the Soviet Union, expenditures channeled into creating a nuclear-missile potential, and the use of threats and provocations against the "socialist and developing states." A warning that domestic difficulties "may push Peking into new foreign policy adventures" was followed by the comment that "no one can guess the limits of these adventures."

Characteristically, Moscow has limited publicity for Mao's 20 May statement by confining its comment to broadcasts beamed to China (discussed in the Indochina section of this TRENDS).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 18 -

MALAYSIA

MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY PRESSES MAOIST CASE FOR ARMED STRUGGLE

A thoroughly Maoist analysis of the revolutionary situation in Malaysia is advanced by the "Communist Party of Malaya" (MCP) in a Central Committee statement dated 25 April, broadcast in installments at both regular and dictation speeds by the China-based clandestine "Voice of the Malayan Revolution" (VMR) beginning on the 26th.

Commemorating the 40th anniversary of the party's founding on 30 April 1930, the statement recasts the party's history in terms of the MCP's current, solidly pro-Peking orientation, presenting past periods of Soviet influence as aberrations and tracing the emergence of the present strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing political power by armed force. The necessity to wage violent revolution has been a dominant theme of the "Voice" since it began broadcasting in November 1969. Two companion themes of these broadcasts--the class basis of the antiregime struggle in Malaysia* and the need for a united front of members of the Chinese, Malay, and Indian communities under MCP leadership--are also elaborated in the statement.

ARMED STRUGGLE The statement's detailed review of the party's 40-year history highlights two "serious errors," both involving "giving up armed struggle." The first, in the 1945-48 period, is traced to the "right capitulationist line" of a "hidden traitor" in party ranks. The second, in the late 1950's, is dubbed a consequence of collusion between "the renegade cliques of Khrushchev and Liu Shao-chi." Overcoming both deviations, the statement declares, the party has affirmed that "only through violent revolution can the people of our country win complete liberation." It has exposed "the fallacy of the so-called 'peaceful transition,'" and it has reemphasized the need to pursue the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside in an armed struggle for political power.

* Consistent with Peking's refusal to recognize the formation of Malaysia, the VMR refers to the country as Malaya. In a rare use of the term Malaysia, the statement refers to "our country" as currently consisting of two "so-called independent countries--the Federation of Malaysia and the Republic of Singapore."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 19 -

**CLASS VERSUS
NATIONALITIES**

The statement depicts a long period of controversy over tactics toward the various ethnic groups in Malaysia, stating that the MCP was unable "for a long time" to definitively settle the question of whether class or nationality is the motive force. The Central Committee reasserts the conclusion, applied consistently in VMR broadcasts, that "in reality, the question of nationalities is in the final analysis one of classes" and that "the class viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought is applicable without exception to the analysis and resolution of the race problem of our country." Accordingly, the statement calls for a struggle by "the people of all nationalities" and characterizes the 13 May 1969 race riots in Malaysia--as Peking media did at the time--as "a massacre of the nationalities" rather than picturing them as specifically anti-Chinese. Neither Peking nor monitored VMR broadcasts have taken notice of the first anniversary of the riots.

Within the framework of the class analysis of the revolutionary situation, the statement elaborates on the need for an MCP-led "national united democratic front" representing the interests of the people of all nationalities who make up the working class, farmers, petty and national bourgeoisie, and the "anti-imperialist patriotic" element. Together with the MCP-led National Liberation Army, this united front is ranged against the landlord and bureaucratic-capitalist classes represented by "the Rahman-Razak and Lee Kuan Yew cliques," the "faithful lackeys" of the United States and Britain and "Soviet revisionist social imperialism."

BACKGROUND The Voice of the Malayan Revolution began broadcasting on 15 November 1969 with reports and commentary in Malay and Mandarin, adding programs in Tamil on 1 February. It is currently on the air six hours a day, with broadcast time divided about equally among the three languages. In keeping with the class approach that cuts across ethnic groupings, VMR does not tailor its broadcasts in the respective languages for the specific ethnic audiences. A daily monitored sample indicates that programming is identical in Malay, Mandarin, and Tamil.

As a principal propaganda outlet for the MCP, the "Voice" gives full publicity to party statements. It regularly protests the allegedly repressive policies of the "chauvinist" Rahman-Razak "clique" against "the people of all nationalities." And it reports--with a time lag of a few days to more than six weeks after the alleged event--successful actions by the party's "liberation army" against regime forces, crediting Mao's thought as the inspiration behind the movement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 20 -

Peking, in turn, bases about three fourths of its propaganda output on Malaysian developments on VMR broadcasts, citing VMR as the source. While Peking media have not so far been heard to carry the lengthy MCP 40th anniversary statement, they have carried other items on the anniversary, credited to the "Voice," and a Chinese Central Committee message to the MCP Central Committee on the anniversary--dated 19 April and carried by NCNA on the 29th--illustrates the identity of the Chinese and Malayan Communist lines. The CCP message, pledging the Chinese party and people's "resolute support of the Malayan people's revolutionary struggle," expresses the conviction that the MCP will persist in "the correct road of using the villages to surround the cities and seizing political power by armed force" and will continue to "frustrate the reactionaries' effort to sow national discord" and to rally "the people of various nationalities." It also hails the MCP for upholding revolutionary principles and struggling against "modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique as its center."

In hailing the party's historical struggles against British imperialism and the "liberation army's" more recent struggles against "joint attacks by the Malayan and Thai reactionaries," the Chinese message reflects another recurrent theme of VMR broadcasts, which seek to discredit the Malaysian Government by linking it with the U.S., British, Japanese, and other "imperialist" powers and with such "reactionary puppets" as the leaders of Indonesia and Thailand.

VMR's comment on international events follows Peking down the line. Thus the "Voice" plays up successes of armed revolutionary movements in India, Indonesia, Burma, the Middle East, and Latin America as well as in South Vietnam and Cambodia, concurrently assailing such policies as the parliamentary road to socialism, associated with Soviet tutelage. An 11 May MCP Central Committee statement on Indochina, carried by both the "Voice" and Peking's NCNA, calls the U.S. move into Cambodia "a frenzied provocation against the people in Southeast Asia" which revealed the United States as a "paper tiger" and showed the "complete bankruptcy" of the U.S. "frauds" regarding peace talks and troop withdrawal. Charging U.S. collusion with "Soviet revisionist social imperialism," the MCP statement hails the summit conference of the Indochinese peoples and the formation of Sihanouk's government-in-exile and forecasts the final victory of the three Indochinese peoples.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 21 -

MIDDLE EAST

KOSYGIN AFFIRMS CONTINUED "EXTENSIVE" ASSISTANCE TO ARABS

Moscow has widely publicized Kosygin's 20 May reply to the joint message sent to him and to President Nixon on the 7th by the heads of state of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan following the annual summit meeting of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in Izmir, Turkey, on 6-7 May. TASS carried the message on the 20th--without mentioning that it was also sent to President Nixon--along with Kosygin's reply.

ISSUE OF Kosygin regrets, in his reply, that there are "still
WITHDRAWAL serious obstacles to relaxation of tension and the
establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East,
adding that the Israeli Government "frustrates all efforts aimed at
a political settlement" of the crisis and is "supported and
encouraged by certain circles in the West." Contrary to the
22 November 1967 Security Council resolution, Kosygin says, the
Israeli Government "still avoids making a clearcut statement on
withdrawal of its troops" and on its agreement to comply with other
provisions of the resolution.

While elsewhere in his reply Kosygin agrees with the three heads of state that "it is necessary to have undelayed withdrawal" of the Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories, his phraseology on Israeli avoidance of a "clearcut statement on withdrawal" is atypical and could conceivably signal some degree of modification of Soviet insistence on actual withdrawal as the key element in a settlement. At a luncheon for a visiting UAR delegation in December Kosygin had called withdrawal an "imperative condition," and in the 1 May PRAVDA Belyayev had reiterated the more explicit, recurrent Soviet line that "fulfillment" of withdrawal is the "cornerstone" of a peaceful settlement. Kosygin's "clearcut statement" formula has not been repeated in routine-level Moscow comment and may have represented no more than an effort to exploit and fuel the recent debate in Israel over the government's refusal to commit itself to a withdrawal policy. Subsequent to the release of Kosygin's statement, Podgornyy was quoted by TASS on 25 May as repeating the standard Soviet position in remarks to the new Syrian ambassador: "We believe withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab areas is absolutely essential for a settlement."

There is no indication of any flexibility on the withdrawal question in TASS accounts of the Security Council debate on Israel's 12-13 May incursion into Lebanon. On the 20th TASS cited Soviet UN delegate Malik as stating that withdrawal "to the positions held before 5 June 1967"--one of the rather infrequent recent Soviet stipulations

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

27 MAY 1970

- 22 -

of the 5 June lines--is a "key matter for a peaceful political settlement." Malik complained that "unwillingness to begin solving this central, main question" is the principal obstacle holding back an agreement of the big four in the consultative meetings. He charged the U.S. representative in the Council with "steering clear of the question of complete withdrawal," which means, he said, that the United States is opposed to such a withdrawal. TASS commentator Orlov made the same point in observing on the 20th that the withdrawal question stands "at the center" of the Middle East crisis. Washington adopts a double-handed policy, Orlov said, professing readiness to agree in principle on withdrawal while "hastening to make stipulations demanding 'changes' or 'corrections' of the borders," in effect blocking the possibility of achieving a settlement.

AID TO ARABS Kosygin's reply to the three heads of state goes beyond the usual vague Soviet propaganda pledges of "necessary" aid to the Arabs to strengthen their "defense potential"; he had said in his speech last December that the USSR would combine a struggle for a political settlement "with the adoption of active measures to strengthen the defense potential" of the UAR and other Arab states. He now declares that the Soviet Union is rendering the Arab states "extensive" assistance "so that they can successfully defend their legitimate national rights," and "we intend to continue exerting our efforts in this direction" with the aim of a settlement in compliance with all provisions of the November resolution.

There have been propaganda references recently to growing Arab resistance to Israeli "aggressive acts" and to the increasing "defense potential" of the UAR and other Arab states. Belyayev commented in the 17 May domestic service roundtable that things "are not going as smoothly and brilliantly as before" for the Israeli military on the Egyptian front, with "every provocation" meeting with a "firmer rebuff." In reporting Nasir's May Day speech TASS had noted his assertion that the initiative now rested with the UAR; and a foreign-language commentary by Tsoppi on the 13th observed that Israel "has obviously begun to lose the initiative in the conflict."

Moscow failed to give further publicity to Kosygin's acknowledgment, in his 4 May press conference, that Soviet "military advisors" are attached to the UAR troops. But another such acknowledgment appears in a TASS English report on the 20th of a press conference statement in Cairo by the UAR official spokesman. TASS quotes the spokesman as saying, with regard to the Middle East situation and Soviet military assistance to the UAR, that "we have never denied the presence of Soviet military experts. But at the same time we should like to point out that both the Soviet and UAR military efforts are defensive in nature."

CONFIDENTIAL

EDTC TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 23 -

Soviet media apparently took no cognizance of recent statements by Soviet military attaches in the Arab countries, reported by Arab sources. The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on 6 May reported the Soviet attache in Baghdad as declaring at a press conference that the Soviet Union provides the Arab armies "with the same arms that the Soviet armed forces use." The next day Baghdad radio reported the attache as stating that the Soviet Government is embarked on "major action" to promote the Arab armies' military capabilities. He claimed, according to Baghdad, that the increased military strength of the Arab armies had so alarmed the "Zionist aggressors" as to "induce them to make false allegations about Soviet pilots participating in the defense of Arab territories." The Soviet military attache in Amman was reported by Baghdad radio on the 8th as stating at a press conference that the Arab countries are now strong enough to reply to any offensive and that the USSR "is prepared to extend any aid" to these countries' struggle against "Zionist aggression."

EBAN U.S. VISIT SEEN AS STEP CONDUCIVE TO NEW ESCALATION

Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban's 20-24 May visit to the United States--to seek deliveries of more Phantom jets, a big loan, and "wider military-political support," according to TASS commentator Tyssovskiy on the 20th--is viewed by PRAVDA's Belyayev on 24 May as "a step leading to a new escalation of the war in the Middle East." This time, Belyayev adds, "Israel is likely to get the fighter planes it asks for, even though the White House declared that it has not yet passed a decision to this effect."

A panelist in the domestic service roundtable on the 24th commented that President Nixon had declined "for tactical reasons" to give Prime Minister Meir a definite answer to her request for Phantoms last September, which Eban had come to renew. Another panelist remarked that although nothing was stated officially about the outcome of Eban's talks with the President and Secretary Rogers, "there can be no doubt that Israel was given an actual agreement on the delivery of new weapons. Moreover, regardless of what is or is not stated officially in Washington, the Israeli aggressors receive everything they need from the United States." In a 25 May foreign-language commentary, Soltan says Eban left Washington in a "good mood" and cites among contributory factors the scale of promised U.S. aid and Washington's "intention" to "force" its NATO allies at the 26-27 Rome meeting to grant Israel military aid.

Various Soviet commentators have played up the report by Jack Anderson in the 19 May Washington POST on "secret deliveries of American bombs to the Israeli air force." TASS commentator

CONFIDENTIAL

27 MAY 1970

- 24 -

Tyssovskiy on the 20th, for example, said Anderson's article implied that Israel gets other armaments besides bombs, and a 23 May foreign-language talk claimed that "many observers" believe other arms are being supplied.

On the matter of a political settlement, Moscow comment on the Eban visit notes that the foreign minister emphasized Israel's intention to defend and hold its positions along the cease-fire line. Soltan's commentary on the 25th says Eban indicated that Israeli withdrawal from the cease-fire line "would be lunacy" and calls this typical of "the arguments of the Tel Aviv extremists."

MOSCOW DECRIES NEW ISRAELI "PROVOCATIONS" AGAINST LEBANON

True to form, Moscow has not reported the 22 May attack on an Israeli school bus by Arab guerrillas operating out of Lebanon. TASS did report on the 22d, however, the Israeli artillery barrage on towns in southern Lebanon which took place less than an hour after the Arab attack. The Israelis' "barbaric action," TASS said, was the second "provocation" against Lebanon in 10 days. A Moscow broadcast to North America on the 23d remarked that this "new crime" occurred before the ink had dried on the Security Council resolution condemning the 12-13 May incursion--a "repetition of aggression" which can only be viewed as an Israeli retaliation against the Security Council resolution and as "a challenge to the United Nations and world public opinion." Apparently, the broadcast added, "Israel intends to make such crimes a daily practice so as to cut off all roads to a peaceful political settlement of the conflict." On 25 May, TASS cited the Lebanese military command for a report that Israeli armored units, supported by aircraft and artillery, had intruded into Lebanon on the 25th and that fighting was continuing.

While Moscow remained silent on the guerrilla attack on the 22d, a panelist in the 24 May roundtable show commented that "at present tension is again being created on the Israeli-Lebanese border" and "we may expect a flareup of serious conflicts on this sector of the front." The commentator said "there will certainly be a new provocation by Israel against its Arab neighbors." A domestic service commentary on 26 May says the Israeli press is developing a "pretext for the next armed provocation," using "the hackneyed theme about actions of Palestinian partisans."

CONFIDENTIAL

27 MAY 1970

- 25 -

N A T O

USSR SEES ATTEMPTS TO "TORPEDO" EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

A spate of Moscow comment on the 26-27 May NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Rome features routine charges that Washington is using the gathering to "justify" the "aggression" in Cambodia. Commentators also assail alleged U.S. efforts to involve the alliance further in the Middle East and the Mediterranean and deplore what is described as a negative NATO posture on the key question of European security.

A lengthy TASS report on the 25th said that the gathering would discuss, "besides the question of spreading the military efforts of NATO," the Warsaw Pact proposal for the convening of an all-European conference on security. Citing the U.S. and West European press, TASS added that alliance leaders would prefer not to discuss this question at all, or at least not to give priority to it, but have been forced to show a regard for European public opinion, which gives "increasing support" to the conference proposal. To make the convening of a conference more difficult, TASS said, its opponents are resorting to various "ruses"--among others, suggesting balanced force and armament reductions by the two alliances and proposing the creation of a permanent commission at the ambassadorial level for talks between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

The following day, a Kozyakov commentary for North America touched on both pending proposals in the course of an attack on Washington for trying to "torpedo" the conference idea. Kozyakov said that the first proposal was already under consideration at the now-recessed Geneva disarmament talks and that the second "can hardly substitute" for a European security conference. Like TASS, the commentary suggested that both proposals are inter-bloc in nature and that a conference must include neutral states in Europe as well as members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The 25 May TASS dispatch was critical of those NATO circles who have suggested that a conference not be convened until the results of the FRG's bilateral talks with the USSR, the GDR, and Poland are clear. The "absurdity" of this attitude is obvious, the dispatch concluded, since the lumping together of these problems could mean an indefinite delay of the European security conference. Earlier, a 22 May PRAVDA article by Beglov on NATO's attitude toward a conference had said that such a European meeting "will in no way hinder the parallel course of bilateral talks between individual states and also talks on disarmament through various channels."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

27 MAY 1970

- 26 -

Several Soviet commentaries have pointed up alleged efforts to involve NATO further in the Middle East, Kozyakov charging that the Rome meeting "is working to knock together a new bloc in the Mediterranean." Kozyakov said Washington is showing interest in the Mediterranean for the same reason that it supports Israel--"to clamp down on the liberation movement in the area." A commentary broadcast to Italian listeners on the 26th says an attempt is being made to restrict the session to a discussion of "artificial and even provocative questions, such as . . . the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean." Asserting that the situation in the Mediterranean in recent years has worsened because of the "gross interference" of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the commentary says the call for a unified NATO naval force is linked with Israeli "aggression" against the Arab countries and serves to prepare public opinion "for more active NATO interference in the Middle East." In defense of the Soviet presence, the commentary repeats the familiar arguments that the Mediterranean lies "close to the frontiers of the Soviet Union" and that Soviet forces there are hailed by "all the Arab peoples."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

27 MAY 1970

- 27 -

WEST GERMANY

GDR LEAVES DOOR OPEN FOR MORE TALKS AFTER KASSEL SUMMIT

The relatively mild tone of the 25 May statement by the GDR Council of Ministers on the 21 May Kassel summit meeting between Premier Stoph and FRG Chancellor Brandt suggests a twofold purpose: to leave the door open for future talks should the FRG become "realistic" and to regain a more reasonable posture for the GDR in the wake of its highly negative, sharply polemical attacks before, at, and immediately after Kassel. Stoph introduced no new proposals at Kassel, devoting his three formal statements almost entirely to bitter attacks on the FRG. GDR media have made extensive use of several incidents--arising from disruptive crowds, the tearing down of a GDR flag, and alleged threats to murder Stoph--to depict the FRG as an unreliable negotiating partner brimming with revanchism.

Soviet media, while accurately reporting the substance of Stoph's attacks, omitted many of the stronger expletives and gave some balance to the picture by providing brief summaries of Brandt's press conference evaluations of the Kassel meeting. GDR media carried no such reports of Brandt's appraisal. Available comment from East European media concludes, as Moscow does, that despite the "more heated" polemics at Kassel as compared with Erfurt, the dialog will continue at some future date and Kassel should not be termed a failure.

GDR STATEMENT The GDR Council of Ministers concludes on 25 May, on the basis of Stoph's report on Kassel, that the FRG's "unrealistic attitude" as revealed in the summit talks proves that the FRG needs more time to "reflect on its attitude and to arrive at a realistic viewpoint." The statement asserts GDR readiness to continue "conversations by the heads of governments" (but by implication not by lower-level negotiators as Brandt proposed) "as soon as" the FRG Government "indicates a realistic attitude" on the basic question--the establishment of relations of equality under international law.

The statement lays new, urgent stress on "equal membership" of the GDR and the FRG in the United Nations "forthwith." This point is given new prominence in Stoph's final formal statement at Kassel, so far available only in a summary released by his press representative and broadcast by East Berlin's Deutschlandsender on the 21st.

STOPH AT KASSEL An unscheduled statement by Stoph, prior to Brandt's formal opening statement of his 20 points, expressed "astonishment" that FRG security forces had not stopped "fascist machinations" and "direct campaigns inciting to murder"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 28 -

against Stoph on his way to the summit meeting. Stoph added, according to ADN, that such machinations would "necessarily encumber our meeting today."

Stoph's major statement at the talks, carried textually by ADN, restates the stock demand for recognition by the FRG and reiterates willingness to sign the GDR's draft treaty "immediately." Virtually the entire statement, however, is devoted to cataloging complaints and charges against the FRG, including accusations that Brandt remains "evasive," that his government has "revanchist aims," that his words and deeds are "grossly contradictory," and that he has alined FRG policy with U.S. global strategy. Stoph again denounces Brandt's proposals for "special intra-German relations" as "absolutely unacceptable" and rejects Brandt's concept of a continuing "unity of the German nation" as "fictional." He says Brandt has shown nothing to indicate a "real change" or "genuine basic renovation" in FRG policy either in his speeches or in the actions of his administration.

Stoph rejects out of hand Brandt's proposals to set up lower-level negotiating commissions, arguing that "things being what they are, it would hardly be meaningful and would ignore the essence of the matter" to establish such working groups on matters of "second- or third-rate importance" before GDR recognition has been agreed upon.

BRANDT'S Stoph's first comment on Brandt's 20-point proposal
"20 POINTS" appears in his third formal statement, summed up by GDR spokesman Lorf at a press conference late on the 21st. Stoph says Brandt's statement of principles for a settlement shows that the FRG's "destructive attitude" will continue and "can only be regarded as a veiled but definite no" to the establishment of relations of equality under international law. Stoph accuses Brandt of again evading this decisive point. The conclusion of Stoph's third statement foreshadowed the Council of Ministers statement, suggesting that if the FRG Government "used the time ahead to ponder and reflect" on the establishment of normal relations with the GDR, "ways and means would be found to continue to exchange views." Stoph reiterated this view in his first interview after the summit late on 21 May, carried by the East Berlin radio, in which he claimed that "the most important point"--international recognition of the GDR--was missing from Brandt's points. Stoph reiterated the GDR's readiness to continue the talks when the FRG "gives evidence of a realistic attitude" on relations, but he did not spell out what such evidence might be.

There has been little GDR comment on Brandt's 20 points, which were published as part of the text of Brandt's main statement at Kassel in the 22 May NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, according to the Hamburg DPA. East

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENLS

27 MAY 1970

- 29 -

Berlin commentator Leuschner on the 21st termed the 20 points an "evasive maneuver" and "a collection of various minor issues" intended "to avoid international law, torpedo the draft treaty submitted by the GDR, and leave the basic question open."

Moscow commentators have adopted a similar view of Brandt's proposal. Glazunov on the 23d told German listeners that the attitude expressed by the 20 points is full of contradictions and actually amounts to a rejection of the GDR's basic demand for recognition. Panelists in the 24 May Moscow domestic service roundtable spoke of the "total inconsistency" of Bonn's policy, adding that the attitude expressed at Kassel by Brandt revealed "still large vestiges of the past" and "a continuing strong dependence on the policy of revanchism" inherited from his predecessors. Brandt's concept of special relations between the two German states, one panelist said, represents an ultimatum-like stand intended to coerce the GDR and prevent its recognition in international organizations.

EVALUATION OF GDR and Soviet media take issue with numerous
KASSEL RESULTS West German commentators who called the Kassel summit a failure, arguing that its positive results included another meeting "as equals" of the heads of the two German states, another opportunity for Stoph to present the GDR viewpoint for West German and world public consideration, and finally the fact that the Kassel talks perhaps compelled Brandt and his advisers to realize the validity and firmness of the GDR stand. Radio Moscow commentator Zakharov, addressing German listeners on the 25th, denied that the GDR has a "hard line" on recognition, as claimed by West German papers, and suggested that perhaps now Bonn will reconsider whether its own nonrecognition line is the real impediment to progress.

Available East European comment on Kassel includes some expressions of disappointment at the "meager results" but optimism that the talks will be resumed later, although no definite date was set for a third meeting. A 22 May Prague CTK dispatch says the talks have "only been interrupted for a time" and have not ended fruitlessly, but Czechoslovak commentaries find little evidence yet that Bonn has "recognized realities." Warsaw's PAP commentator Guz criticizes Brandt's 20 points for omitting the "one most important point," GDR recognition, calling them a "blurred formulation" with the "distinct features of a bargaining element." Other Polish press comment on the 22d, reported by PAP, sees "no visible effects" from the talks at Kassel, which appeared to be a "tougher" East-West German confrontation than the one at Erfurt and to have produced "weaker" prospects for an understanding.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

27 MAY 1970

- 30 -

MOSCOW REPORTS END OF GROMYKO-BAHR TALKS, AVOIDS COMMENT

TASS reports the conclusion of the May round of talks between Foreign Minister Gromyko and FRG State Secretary Bahr on 22 May but continues to avoid commenting on their progress. The 22 May announcement simply noted the "exchange of views" on questions connected with the "intention" of the two countries to conclude an agreement on renunciation of the use of force--the identical language used in TASS' 22 March announcement on the windup of the earlier round. There has been no Moscow pickup of widespread West German press and DPA reports of "optimistic" opinions by Bahr about the future success of the talks, Bahr's "favorable" assessment of progress, or speculation that Foreign Minister Scheel may soon go to Moscow to continue the negotiations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 31 -

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

POLYANSKIY URGES MORE FOR AGRICULTURE IN NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN

First Deputy Premier Polyanskiy, agriculture's leading spokesman in the Soviet leadership, has appealed for increased stress on agriculture in the five-year plan now being drafted. The new plan "must be a five-year plan for considerable upsurge in agriculture," he declares. Polyanskiy's present appeal is reminiscent of his repeated public demands for reallocations in favor of agriculture during a long Politburo debate over resources in 1967.

Writing in the April SOVIETS OF WORKERS DEPUTIES (signed to press 20 March), Polyanskiy affirms that the Central Committee and the Soviet Government are "now considering the preliminary materials connected with working out the new five-year plan." Kirilenko also mentioned the upcoming debate on the plan in a 14 April speech in Yerevan: "The Central Committee and Council of Ministers are already considering the direction" of the new plan, he said, and Gosplan and other organs are now completing the draft, "which will soon be debated" by the Politburo and government.

Although Polyanskiy states that "the party and government are now doing the maximum possible" for improving agriculture and rural living standards in the new plan, he simultaneously argues that previous policy was less than fair to agriculture and should be altered. He says "it would be incorrect to attribute the disproportions and disparities between the development of industry and agriculture and the lagging of the light, food, meat and dairy industries behind growing needs only to objective factors" such as "complicated international circumstances; . . . one must also distinctly see the shortcomings of a subjective character and eliminate them in good time." The "tasks of creating an abundance of agricultural products" and "bringing the level of life of city and village closer together" require an alteration of priorities, he adds, and must find "a clearer expression" in the new five-year plan "than in the past."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 32 -

P R C I N T E R N A L A F F A I R S

PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP TURNOUTS INDICATE SOME CHANGES

Accounts of provincial rallies held to commemorate Mao's 20 May statement on Cambodia, the first event to produce a widespread turnout of provincial leaders since National Day on 1 October, indicate that a number of military leaders may have been shifted from their previous duties. The rallies also brought forth some civilian leaders absent from public view in recent months--notably Li Hsueh-feng, Hopei chief and alternate member of the Politburo.

In Inner Mongolia, which recently lost half of its territory to its neighbors, there was a further indication that the former military region is now a district under the Peking region. The chief speaker and some of the other leaders present were identified by NCNA on 23 May as "leading members of the Peking units of the PLA." Inner Mongolia chairman Teng Hai-ching, who has not appeared in the region since October, remained absent.

In Shansi, where almost the entire leadership structure seems to have been altered as a result of factional struggles since the days when it was a model revolutionary province, Hsieh Chen-hua was identified as the new PLA commander in an NCNA account on the 22d. The long absence of Chairman Liu Ko-ping continued.

Only in Heilungkiang and Shanghai, among the first half-dozen provinces and special municipalities to form revolutionary committees in the spring of 1967, did the old leaders appear. In addition to Liu Ko-ping of Shansi, Peking chief Hsieh Fu-chih, Shantung chairman Wang Hsiao-yu, and Kweichow chairman Li Tsai-han failed to appear. The only other provincial-level chief who did not appear, Li Yuan of Hunan, is a military commander and may have been transferred to other duties--as may also be the case with Inner Mongolia's chairman.

One possible explanation for the absence of some provincial chiefs is that they are temporarily working in the countryside in line with recent exhortations in the national media. On 25 May, however, NCNA took pains to note that Kwangsi chairman Wei Kuo-ching, "who is now working in selected basic units to get experience to guide overall work," attended a rally in Liuchow. And on the 24th NCNA reported that Sinkiang chairman Lung Shu-chin is "carrying out investigations" in Akosu district, where he attended a rally.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 33 -

EDITORIAL STRESSES PARTY LEADERSHIP OVER CREATIVE ARTS

A joint RED FLAG/PEOPLE'S DAILY/LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial, released by NCNA on 22 May, highlighted this year's unusual celebration of the 28th anniversary of Mao's "Talks at the Yen'an Forum on Literature and Art." Except on the 25th anniversary in 1967, observances of the occasion in recent years have been low-keyed affairs; in 1969 the anniversary drew no comment in central media, and in 1968 there was only one NCNA report. This year's anniversary, by contrast, is receiving extensive national and provincial publicity. RED FLAG No. 5 marked the anniversary by publishing a revised libretto for the opera "Red Lantern" as well as a new piano concerto entitled "Yellow River." The journal lauded Chiang Ching for her role in reforming literature and art.

The joint editorial, on the other hand, neither mentions Chiang Ching nor dwells on revolutionary art and literature, but uses the occasion to push for greater party control over intellectuals while also attempting to revitalize the ideological rebuilding of the party. Stressing a general need to remold one's world outlook through proletarian literature and art, the editorial refers specifically to sections from Mao's 1942 article which relate to current efforts to rebuild the party and overcome factionalism. The editorial condemns those cadres who joined the party organizationally but "who have not yet joined the party ideologically" and hold to a "me first" attitude, form factions, seek personal advancement, and feel "contempt for physical labor." To overcome these shortcomings, all party members as well as revolutionaries who desire to join the party must remold their ideology "through a long and even painful process" of more class struggle and integration with workers, peasants, and soldiers, the editorial says.

Reports on provincial rallies marking the anniversary spell out the intention to strengthen party control over intellectuals and to use the Yen'an "Talks" as a guide for future party-building activity. NCNA on 23 May, reporting on nationwide celebrations of the anniversary, noted that party members throughout the country expressed their determination "to solve the question of joining the party ideologically" by study of this "important editorial." NCNA pointed specifically to a Hunan provincial conference on party building--not previously mentioned in Hunan's provincial media--which after study of the joint editorial concluded that priority must be given to ideological rectification in the process of party building and that study of the "Talks" was "the fundamental way" to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970

- 34 -

acquire the correct ideological outlook necessary for party membership. On 24 May Shenyang radio reported on a local rally at which the chairman of the Shenyang Municipal Revolutionary Committee stated that the article "is by no means limited to literary and art problems" and can be used in strengthening "the party leadership over cultural and educational work."

CONFIDENTIAL